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Abstract 
 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4 standard 
provides a wireless mesh network specification on which the ZigBee protocol is based.  
ZigBee networks are becoming increasingly popular for use in medical, industrial, and 
other applications.  By design, ZigBee devices are low-cost and able to form Wireless 
Personal Area Networks (WPANs) where low-cost and extended battery life are desirable 
features.  Traditional security techniques for ZigBee networks are based on presenting 
and verifying device bit-level credentials (keys).  While historically effective to some 
degree, bit-level only security is becoming increasingly insufficient and ZigBee networks 
are vulnerable to attack by any unauthorized rogue device that can obtain and present bit-
level credentials for an authorized device. 
Previous related research has shown that an additional physical layer (PHY) of 
security can be applied to augment ZigBee bit-level security.  This additional PHY 
security is achieved using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) 
fingerprinting.  This research focused on utilizing a National Instruments (NI) X310 
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) hosting an on-board Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA).  The demonstrations included device discrimination assessments using       
like-model ZigBee AVR RZUSBstick devices and included generating RF “fingerprints” 
in real-time, as an extension to AFIT’s RF-DNA fingerprinting work.  The goal was to 
develop a fingerprinting process that was both 1) effective at discriminating between like-
model ZigBee devices and 2) efficient for implementation in FPGA hardware. 
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A comparison was made between 1) fingerprints generated in the traditional 
MATLAB environment, and 2) RF-DNA fingerprints generated on the Kintex-7 FPGA 
hosted on the NI X310 SDR.  RF-DNA discrimination performance using fingerprints 
generated in real-time on FPGA hardware consistently exceeded an arbitrary percent 
classification benchmark of       .  This was verified across         
independent trials using the full-dimensional       feature set at a collected Signal-to-
Noise Ratio of             .  Fingerprinting performance using dimensionally-
reduced sets of      features (a proper subset of       full-dimensional features) 
derived from instantaneous Real (     ), Imaginary (     ), and Amplitude (    ) 
responses was statistically similar based on 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for all subsets 
and averaged       .  Fingerprinting performance using a dimensionally reduced 
set of      instantaneous Phase (    ) features resulted in statistically poorer 
classification performance of       .  As designed and implemented, the full-
dimensional FPGA fingerprint generator only utilized approximately 7% of the X310 
Kintex-7 FPGA resources.  The full-dimensional fingerprinting performance of    
    using only 7% of FPGA resources demonstrates the feasibility for real-time RF-
DNA fingerprint generation and like-model ZigBee device discrimination using an SDR 
platform.  
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REAL-TIME RF-DNA FINGERPRINTING OF ZIGBEE DEVICES 
USING A SOFTWARE-DEFINED RADIO WITH FPGA PROCESSING 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides the operational and technical motivations for conducting 
this research.  Section 1.2 describes the Operational Motivation for focusing on ZigBee 
wireless network applications.  Section 1.3 provides the Technical Motivation which is 
based on prior Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Radio Frequency Distinct 
Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting work, and the relative contributions of this 
research.  Section 1.4 provides organizational details for this document. 
1.2 Operational Motivation 
 Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) are increasingly popular in personal, 
medical, industrial and other applications.  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4 standard provides a specification for wireless mesh networks 
on which the ZigBee protocol is based.  By design, ZigBee devices able to form WPANs 
where low-cost and extended battery life are desirable features.  Traditional security 
techniques for ZigBee networks are predominantly based on presenting and verifying 
device bit-level credentials (e.g. keys).  While historically effective, ZigBee networks 
remain vulnerable to attack by unauthorized rogue devices that can obtain and present 
false bit-level credentials matching an authorized device.  Even without prior knowledge 
of the correct key, replay attacks against inadequately-defended networks can still be 
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employed in which a packet transmitted by an authorized device is collected and later 
replayed by an unauthorized device [18].  
1.3 Technical Motivation 
 As shown in Table 1.1 there is a considerable amount of previous related research 
[4,12,13,17,20,29,32,33,34] addressing Physical (PHY) layer of security of wireless 
communication systems.  Some of the methods in these works were adopted and applied 
here to address ZigBee PHY-based bit-level security augmentation.  The additional PHY 
security is achieved using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) 
fingerprinting.  RF-DNA exploitation involves generating device “fingerprint” from PHY 
waveform responses to achieve human-like device discrimination–a unique one-to-one 
association between a fingerprint and a device.  The RF-DNA fingerprint used to 
discriminate among devices, even when identical bit-level credentials are presented.  
While previous AFIT research has demonstrated the effectiveness of MATLAB 
simulation-based RF-DNA classification of ZigBee devices [5,20,23], the research here 
represents the next step towards achieving real-time device classification and verification.  
A complete RF-DNA based security solution for ZigBee devices in the form of an air 
monitor is proposed in [23].  The air monitor would be physically co-located with ZigBee 
devices and actively accept or reject signals from other ZigBee devices based on their 
fingerprint signatures.  The purpose of this research was to demonstrate feasibility of 
implementing an air monitor using a National Instruments (NI) X310 Software-Defined 
Radio (SDR) hosting a Kintex-7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). 
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 Table 1.1 provides a summary of technical areas that were previously addressed 
and areas addressed in this research.  The amount of previous related research listed in 
Table 1.1 shows that the efficacy of RF-DNA fingerprinting has been well-established.  
The general methodology of the RF-DNA fingerprinting process has remained relatively 
unchanged in this research given the success of these previous works. 
1.4 Document Organization 
 The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
basic outline of the ZigBee protocol, SDR implementation, and background on the RF-
DNA processes employed in this research.  Chapter 3 provides the methodology used for 
experimental signal collection, FPGA hardware design, classification, three fingerprint 
generation methods, device ID verification, and DRA.  Chapter 4 presents classification 
results for the three fingerprint generation methods, classification performance using 
DRA feature sets, device ID verification, rogue rejection and FPGA resource utilization.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusions based on research results and 
recommendations for future work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
     Table 1.1: Technical areas in previous related work and current research contributions. 
Technical Area  Previous Work This Work 
 Addressed Ref #  
TD Features X [4,13,17,20,29,32,33,34] X 
SD Features X [27,29,33]  
WD Features X [12,12]  
 
Fingerprint Generation Platform 
Computer X 
[4,10,11,12,13,17, 
26,27,29,32,33,34] 
X 
FPGA X 
 
X 
 
Signal Type 
802.11 WiFi X [11,12,33] 
 
GSM Cellular X [24]  
802.16e WiMax X [26,27,32,33]  
802.15.4 ZigBee X [4,20] X 
 
Classifier Type 
MDA/ML X [4,10,12,17,20,26,27,29,32,33,34] X 
GRLVQI X [4,11,17] X 
 
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) 
GRLVQI X [4,11,17] X 
LFS X [10] 
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II. Background 
This chapter provides the technical background supporting the methodology 
described in Chapter 3.  Section 2.1 provides details for the ZigBee protocol defined by 
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) [9].  Section 
2.2 describes the Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprint 
generation process which includes calculation of statistical features over a selected 
Region Of Interest (ROI) within time-domain signal responses.  Section 2.3 describes 
model development and device discrimination using the Multiple Discriminant Analysis, 
Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier.  This is followed by Section 2.4 which 
describes the Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) 
classifier.  Section 2.5 provides a description of Software-Defined Radio (SDR) 
implementation and benefits.  The chapter concludes with Section 2.6 that describes 
attributes of a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and benefits for its use. 
2.1 ZigBee Signal Characteristics 
ZigBee devices are used to form low-cost, low-power WPANs and support 
network-enabled home appliances, home automation, industrial control, medical data 
monitoring and other applications.  ZigBee devices are designed according to the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard [9] which includes provisions supporting several possible modulation 
schemes and frequency bands.  For this research, the IEEE 802.15.4 frequency band 
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spanning 2400.0 to 2483.5 MHz was used with 16-ary Offset-Quadrature Phase Shift 
Keying (O-QPSK) data modulation.  Each channel has an instantaneous RF bandwidth of 
           , with Ch =5.0 MHz spacing between adjacent channels.  Figure 2.1 
shows the spectral location and assignment of channels 11-26. 
  ZigBee transmissions are specified to begin with a preamble region consisting of 
8 O-QPSK symbols mapping to 32 binary zeros.  Previous research [13] has shown that 
this preamble region can be successfully exploited to generate fingerprints and provide 
reliable device discrimination using an MDA/ML classifier; this is described in greater 
detail in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.   
2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation 
RF-DNA fingerprinting is the process of characterizing the inherent differences in 
emission responses collected from multiple devices.  These differences are the result of 
factors such as operating temperature, device age, and variations in manufacturing 
tolerance [25].  Fingerprints can be generated from multiple responses, in multiple 
untransformed and transformed domains.  Fingerprints in this work were generated using 
a two step process: 1) generation of instantaneous Time-Domain (TD) responses, and 
 
Figure 2.1: Spectral Location of ZigBee Channels Number 11-26 [28]. 
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2) statistical feature generation over the selected TD ROI.  Each step is described in detail 
below. 
2.2.1 Time-Domain Waveform Response 
The common TD features used for RF-DNA fingerprint generation are 
instantaneous amplitude (a), phase ( ), and frequency (f) responses of a given ROI.  
Elements of the corresponding discrete sequences {    }, {     , and {    } are 
calculated from Real (     ) and Imaginary (     ) ROI components as follows [2,3,4]: 
                     , (2.1) 
            
     
     
 , for         , (2.2) 
      
 
  
 
     
  
  . (2.3) 
The resultant {    }, {     , and {    } sequences are centered (mean removed) 
and normalized as follows:  
 
      
       
   
 
       
   (2.4) 
 
       
       
   
 
        
  (2.5) 
 
       
       
   
 
        
  (2.6) 
where   ,    , and    are corresponding sequence means and  “max” represents the 
maximum value of the centered sequences {      , {     } and {      .  The resultant 
{      ,          and {         sequences are the centered, normalized TD sequences used 
for statistical RF-DNA feature calculation. 
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2.2.2 Statistical RF-DNA Features 
The centered, normalized sequences from (2.4) through (2.6) are divided into    
equal length, contiguous subsequences (ROI subregions) and summarized using      
statistical metrics of standard deviation ( ), variance (  ), skewness ( ) and kurtosis ( ) 
that are computed over each of    subregions.  Each of the summary statistics is also 
computed over the entire ROI, resulting in a total of      regions being used.  This 
process is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
The summary  ,   ,   and   statistics are calculated as follows [25]: 
 
   
 
 
           
 
   
  (2.7) 
 
   
 
 
           
 
   
  (2.8) 
 
  
 
   
            
 
   
 (2.9) 
 
  
 
   
            
 
   
 (2.10) 
where   is total number of samples in a given subsequence and      represents a an 
arbitrary TD response.  The summary statistics for a given region    are then 
concatenated to form vector     as follows: 
            
             (2.11) 
where                .  The vector     is computed for each of      regions, and 
used to form vector    as, 
 
9 
 
Figure 2.2: Representative Illustration of RF-DNA Statistical Fingerprint Generation for 
     Total Subregions [25]. 
 
 
                        
                   (2.12) 
where   represents one of the TD responses  ,   or  .  Finally, the composite statistical 
fingerprint vector   is formed by concatenating the    vector of each TD response as 
follows: 
                        (2.13) 
The resultant full-dimensional fingerprint vector   from (2.13) contains a total of 
                                                               elements. 
2.3 MDA/ML Classification 
 MDA/ML device discrimination includes two distinct processes: Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model development and Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
classification.  The goal of MDA is to reduce feature dimensionality and provide the 
greatest separation between multiple input classes.  This is accomplished by projecting 
full-dimensional fingerprints into a lower-dimensional space, while 1) maximizing 
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between-class spread and 2) minimizing within-class spread.  The between-class (  ) and 
within-class (    scatter matrices are computed using [31]:  
 
      
  
   
    (2.14) 
 
                    
  
  
   
 (2.15) 
where    and    are the covariance matrix and prior probability, respectively, for each of 
the    input classes.  The   -dimensional input RF-DNA fingerprint vectors,     from 
(2.13), are then projected into the     -dimensional space according to  
          , (2.16) 
where  is the           projection matrix formed from the      Eigenvectors of 
  
     and    is the RF-DNA fingerprint projection into the lower dimensional subspace.   
 Classification performance depends on the effectiveness of the   matrix in 
maximizing between-class distance and minimizing within-class spread.  To illustrate the 
projection of     using , two possible MDA projection matrices (   and  ) are shown 
in Figure 2.3 [25].  In this case, projection matrix    provides the “best” classification 
model. 
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Figure 2.3: Representative Projections using   and   for a      Class Problem into 
a 2-Dimensional Space [25]. 
 
Classification of the projected fingerprints    is performed using a Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) process based on Bayesian posterior probability and assuming uniform 
costs and equal prior probability.  A similarity measure is computed by comparing the 
likeness of the unknown    fingerprint to each of       classes.  The classification 
decision is made by assigning (rightly or wrongly) unknown fingerprint    to the class 
yielding the highest measure of similarity.  
2.4 GRLVQI Classification 
 The GRLVQI classifier was also considered to provide a comparison to 
MDA/ML.  Like MDA/ML, GRLVQI is used to discriminate between multiple classes 
but provides several advantages, namely: 1) there is no inherent assumption of the 
distribution of input data, 2) GRLVQI is more suitable for cases where input class data 
(fingerprints) is noisy or inconsistent, and 3) a relevance ranking is generated for each 
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RF-DNA fingerprint feature [25].  Like prior related research, the GRLVQI relevance 
ranking is of particular interest given it provides a means numerically rank features and 
enable Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA). 
 For this research, GRLVQI was implemented as described in [25], with       
prototype vectors representing each of the    classes.  An RF-DNA fingerprint is 
classified as one of    classes by measuring the Euclidean distance between mapped 
fingerprints and each prototype vector; the input fingerprint is assigned to the class whose 
prototype vector is the minimum Euclidean distance from the mapped fingerprint.  Figure 
2.4 displays a visualization of the GRLVQI classification process. 
2.5 Software-Defined Radio (SDR) 
A Software-Defined Radio (SDR) is a radio system in which components that 
have been traditionally implemented with analog hardware, such as mixers or filters, are 
replaced with a software-based implementation.  SDR technology has quickly gaining 
popularity within the last decade given the increased performance in embedded 
microprocessors and general-purpose computers which enable implementation of highly 
complex radio systems.  An SDR can be rapidly reconfigured to change modulation 
scheme, bandwidth, and other key parameters that are normally fixed in an analog design.  
The SDR functionality can be implemented in a general purpose computer, Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or any combination thereof.  Implementations that 
only rely on a general purpose computer can have extremely high latency because the 
signal has to propagate from the receiver to the computer system, normally through a 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) or Ethernet connection.  Components implemented on an  
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Figure 2.4: GRLVQI Classification of an Unknown Fingerprint Based on Minimum 
Euclidean Distance [25]. 
 
 
FPGA can have very low latency, achieving speeds close to that of an integrated circuit 
specifically designed for the task at hand.    
2.6 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
 A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a chip that can be programmed to 
rearrange its internal logic gates to perform a specific function.  For example, an FPGA 
can be programmed to process images, implement an encryption algorithm or even to act 
as a general purpose microprocessor.  An FPGA is typically chosen in an application 
where specialized operations are required and where requirements are expected to change 
over time.  In an SDR system as described in Section 2.5, an FPGA can take the place of 
mixers, filters, and more.  These operations that were once performed with fixed 
hardware can be rapidly reconfigured in an FPGA implementation.  Additionally, the 
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FPGA can be physically located in close proximity to an Analog-to-Digital Converter 
(A/D) to minimize overall latency of the radio system.  Because of the increasing 
capabilities of modern FPGAs, more SDR functionality can be migrated toward FPGA 
implementation and away from general purpose computers. 
 2.6.1 Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer (CORDIC) 
 Many communications systems require computation of instantaneous phase as 
part of the modulation/demodulation scheme.  Instantaneous phase is calculated using an 
arctangent operation as shown in (2.2).  There are multiple algorithms available to 
implement trigonometric function using an FPGA, Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer 
(CORDIC) being one of the most popular.  CORDIC is a hardware-efficient algorithm 
that only requires addition, subtraction and table lookup operations [2].  The CORDIC 
can operate in two modes: vectoring mode and rotation mode.  When operating in 
rotation mode, the sine and cosine values for a given angle are calculated.  This operation 
is accomplished by rotating a unit length vector from the x-axis to the given angle with 
successively smaller rotations until the given angle is reached.  The sine and cosine 
values are determined based on the direction of each angular rotation.  Using this 
technique, a vector can be converted from a polar to rectangular coordinate system.  The 
rotation mode of the CORDIC process is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
 When operating in vectoring mode, the CORDIC operations described above are 
reversed and the magnitude and angle are generated for a given x-y coordinate pair.  
Vectoring mode operation results in a conversion from a rectangular to polar coordinate 
system.    
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Figure 2.5: Example Operation of CORDIC in Rotation Mode [14].  
 
2.6.2 Cascaded Integrator-Comb (CIC) Filter 
 In a high-speed SDR system, extracting a narrow-band signal requires down-
sampling and filtering.  For high decimation rates, a long filter with many coefficients is 
required for sufficient anti-aliasing filtering.  This can become a large bottleneck in the 
SDR system, both in terms of latency time and required hardware resources [3]. 
 The Cascaded Integrator-Comb (CIC) filter is a popular filter choice for SDR 
systems [16].  The CIC filter operates using only addition and subtraction operations; 
there is no multiplication required in the CIC design.  This makes the CIC a particularly 
attractive option for FPGA-based SDR systems where hardware resources are limited and 
multiply operations are especially costly in terms of FPGA resources.  Additionally, 
unlike most discrete filters the, CIC has a decimator built into its architecture. 
 A CIC design consists of    “integrator” addition stages followed by the same 
number of “comb” subtraction stages.  The decimator can be located either at the end of  
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Figure 2.6: Example CIC Design with      Stages [15].  The  Symbols Denote 
Modulo-2 Addition, Z-1 Denotes a Delay by One Clock Cycle, and ↓R Denotes Down-
Sampling (Decimation). 
 
all stages or between the integrator and comb stages.  An example CIC design is shown 
in Figure 2.6.  In the case of Figure 2.6, the decimator is located between the integrator 
and comb stages. 
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III. Methodology  
Wireless communication devices are inherently insecure because the transmission 
medium can be accessed by unauthorized users.  Traditional mechanisms to secure the 
communications channel are based on encoding information at the bit level only.  These 
security mechanisms can be bypassed by forging the required bit-level credentials.  This 
research aims to characterize a hardware-based security mechanism for protecting 
wireless systems from malicious attacks.  The proposed solution generates real-time 
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints as described in 
Chapter 2. 
This chapter describes the methodology used to obtain the experimental results 
presented in Chapter 4.  The experimental X310 SDR methodology for assessing RF-
DNA fingerprinting in this research is shown in Figure 3.1. 
A simplified fingerprint generation scheme suitable for implementation on a Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) was developed.  The signal of interest for this 
research was ZigBee emissions.  A MATLAB model was created to validate the 
performance of the new prototypical fingerprint generation process.  ZigBee beacon 
requests (bursts) were experimentally collected on the X310 Software-Defined Radio 
(SDR) platform.  The collected signals were processed in MATLAB to generate      
fingerprints and evaluate Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood 
(MDA/ML) classification performance.   
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Figure 3.1: X310 SDR Methodology for Assessing RF-DNA Fingerprinting Using 
Matlab (    ), FPGA-Simulation (    ), and FPGA-Hardware (    ) Generated Fingerprints 
[30]. 
 
A modular FPGA design was planned and implemented using ModelSim FPGA 
simulation tools.  The simulation model was validated using actual ZigBee bursts 
collected by the X310 SDR.  The use of experimentally collected signals ensured realistic 
operation would be recreated as closely as possible.  The FPGA simulation-generated 
fingerprints      were exported to MATLAB for MDA/ML classification evaluation.  The 
FPGA design was compiled for use on the X310 SDR Kintex-7 FPGA and uploaded to 
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the device.  The X310 SDR collected emissions from multiple Zigbee devices and FPGA-
Hardware generated      fingerprints using the embedded FPGA.  Hardware generated      
fingerprints were transferred to MATLAB and validated using both MDA/ML and 
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifiers. 
Topics in this chapter are presented sequentially relative to the experimental 
methodology overview illustrated in Figure 3.1.  Section 3.1 describes the X310 SDR 
configuration and setup procedures followed for the collection of radiated bursts.  Section 
3.2 describes the MATLAB model for FPGA fingerprint generation.  Section 3.3 
describes the FPGA fingerprinting implementation.  Section 3.4 describes Dimensional 
Reduction Analysis (DRA) techniques used in this research.  Section 3.5 details the 
process of device discrimination using the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers.   
3.1 Experimental Signal Collection  
3.1.1 X310 SDR Receiver Configuration 
The receiver used in this research was a National Instruments (NI) Universal 
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) X310 Software-Defined Radio (SDR).  The X310 
SDR is a commercially available, inexpensive (approximately $5,000) SDR with transmit 
and receive capabilities covering DC to 6.0 GHZ depending on daughterboard installed.  
For this research, the SBX-40 daughterboard was installed and provided a receive 
frequency range of 400-4400 MHz with a maximum instantaneous bandwidth of    
       .  A block diagram of the X310 SDR receiver architecture is shown in Figure 
3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: X310 SDR Receiver Architecture [6]. 
 
 The RF emitting devices used in this research included      AVR 
RZUSBsticks.  RZUSBstick is a device designed by Atmel Corporation for the 
development, debugging and demonstration of IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, and ZigBee 
[1].  The RZUSBstick uses the Universal Serial Bus (USB) for configuration, 
transmission and reception of ZigBee data.  
The RZUSBstick devices were connected to a computer running the open-source 
tool zbstumbler.  Zbstumbler is an application from the killerbee suite, a popular 
collection of software tools used to manipulate ZigBee devices [21].  Zbstumbler was 
used to configure the devices to broadcast a ZigBee beacon request at a fixed interval 
indefinitely.  The ZigBee channel used in this research was number NZC = 26 having a 
center frequency of             .  Channel NZC = 26 was chosen for consistency with  
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Figure 3.3: Normalized Frequency Domain Response of the SBX-40 Daughterboard 
Anti-Aliasing Filter (Positive Frequencies Only). 
 
prior related work [20] to help mitigate interference from IEEE 802.11 WiFi.  The SBX-
40 instantaneous bandwidth is            which was sufficient for collecting 
            ZigBee emissions as described in Section 2.1.  The one-sided 
frequency domain response of the SBX-40 anti-aliasing filter is shown in Figure 3.3. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the bandwidth of the SBX-40 analog anti-aliasing 
filter is                .  The collected ZigBee emissions were down-converted to 
an Intermediate Frequency (IF) using the analog mixer/anti-aliasing filter on the SBX-40.  
The complex waveform was sampled at        MS/s by the 14-bit dual channel 
Analog to Digital Converter (A/D) on the X310 SDR.  The digital complex waveform 
was then sent to the FPGA to be digitally down-converted to baseband.  The Digital 
Down-Conversion (DDC) chain in the FPGA is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
22 
I
Q
Phz
Cordic
“LO Mixer”
CIC
200MS/s
HB HB HB
Settings Register
To Ethernet
Downsample by 40
D
ow
ns
am
pl
e 
by
 2
D
ow
ns
am
pl
e 
by
 2
D
ow
ns
am
pl
e 
by
 2
 
Figure 3.4: Digital Down-Conversion (DDC) Chain of X310 SDR with Received Signal 
Path in Red. 
 
The DDC chain implemented uses a Coordinate Rotation Digital Computer 
(CORDIC) based mixer to down-convert the digitized signal to baseband.  The CORDIC 
algorithm was implemented in rotation mode as described in Chapter 2.  A Cascaded 
Integrator-Comb filter (CIC) was used to perform low-pass filtering and downsampling 
on the complex digital waveform.  Unlike other common filters, the CIC has a decimator 
built into its architecture, simplifying the downsampling process.  The CIC was chosen 
for this hardware application given its computational simplicity which only requires 
addition and subtraction operations for the CIC filter design.  The CIC filter block 
diagram is shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: 4-Stage       CIC Filter [15]. 
 
The CIC design consists of      “integrator” addition stages followed by 
     “comb” subtraction stages and an       decimator.  The CIC was implemented 
as described in [8].  The normalized CIC frequency response is shown in Figure 3.6. 
The CIC decimates the            signal to a new sample rate of    
     .  The sample rate of          is suitable for the previously described 
            bandwidth of ZigBee channel NZC = 26.  The sample rate of    
      was experimentally deemed sufficient for correct demodulation of ZigBee 
emissions.  The CIC also performs filtering on the complex waveform.  The digital down-
conversion chain implemented also contains selectable half-band filters for use with 
different sample rates, but they are not selected in this research.  The baseband signal is 
then routed out of the X310 SDR FPGA and to the computer via Ethernet.  
3.1.2 X310 SDR Receiver Configuration 
All collections were made within a shielded Ramsey STE6000 test enclosure to 
ensure a low-noise collection environment for initial proof-of-concept demonstration.  
The commercial shielded test enclosure used is shown in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.6: Normalized Frequency Response of 4-stage       CIC Filter. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Ramsey STE6000 Shielded Test Enclosure [19]. 
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The Ramsey STE6000 was chosen because it was designed for use with 
Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band signals such as Bluetooth, WiFi and 
ZigBee [19].  The STE6000 provides over 90.0 dB of attenuation at           
according to manufacturer specification.  Additionally, the interior has an RF absorbent 
foam coating that attenuates by          , mitigating multipath interference.  The 
STE6000 was equipped with Ethernet and USB connections so it can remain closed while 
controlling the X310 SDR and ZigBee device, respectively.    
The ZigBee Device Under Test (DUT) was connected to the internal USB port of 
the STE6000.  The X310 SDR was positioned such that its antenna was          from 
the DUT.  The STE6000 was closed and sealed.  The computer was used to configure the 
X310 SDR FPGA with the proper firmware.  For signal collection, the receiver mode 
firmware was flashed onto the FPGA.  For RF-DNA fingerprint generation, the 
fingerprint generation mode firmware was flashed onto the FPGA.  Zbstumbler software 
was initiated to configure the DUT to broadcast ZigBee beacon requests at ZigBee 
channel NZC = 26 with a rate of           (bursts per second).  The X310 SDR was 
then configured to initiate the start of signal collection.  Received signals (or generated 
fingerprints) were then streamed over Ethernet to the computer where they were saved to 
the hard-disk.  This process was repeated for all      devices. 
3.2 MATLAB Model for FPGA Fingerprint Generation 
To demonstrate fingerprint generation in real-time on the FPGA platform, it was 
desirable to reduce the computational complexity of previous fingerprint generation 
methods.  FPGA operations occur in real-time and on synthesized hardware.  Certain 
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operations that can be easily calculated with enough time in MATLAB are costly in fixed 
hardware resources on an FPGA.  For this reason, a reduced-complexity fingerprinting 
model was developed with MATLAB as a reduced-complexity subset of the traditional 
fingerprinting process. 
3.2.1  Burst Detection 
Accurate burst detection of the target signal is critical to the RF-DNA process.  If 
the collected bursts are not properly aligned, the statistical features will cross the region 
boundaries, which will degrade process performance process.  Therefore, the first step in 
the RF-DNA process is the alignment of collected bursts.  A burst detection algorithm 
was developed that could operate in real-time, with low latency and with low 
computational complexity.  A squaring-smoothing amplitude detection algorithm was 
applied to the real-valued waveform Re of the incoming signal as follows: 
 
     
                                 
  
  (3.1) 
The resultant value   is compared to a threshold value  .  When       , the 
start of the burst is indicated as         to collect the transient turn-on region of the 
transmitted waveform.  Though the Re component was used to detect the burst, similar 
results can be obtained using the signal Im component.  A representative output of the 
smoothing algorithm is shown in Figure 3.8. 
The threshold value   was empirically chosen to give consistent burst detection 
performance.  Knowing the duration of the ZigBee preamble and the starting sample 
number, we can select the beginning and end of the ZigBee preamble waveform.  The 
detected preamble was then extracted from the signal for fingerprint generation. 
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Figure 3.8: Output of Squaring-Smoothing Burst Detection Algorithm. 
 
3.2.2 Fingerprint Generation 
The ZigBee waveform preamble is the region of interest (ROI) for ZigBee 
fingerprint generation.  The preamble duration is standardized to be             per 
the IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee specification [9].  At a sample rate of          this 
corresponds to a length of        samples.  The ROI is further separated into       
equal length subregions.  Because fingerprints are calculated in real-time on the FPGA, 
odd-numbered subregions ([1, 3, 5, 7, 9]) are received and processed during the time of 
even numbered subregions ([2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).  Therefore, the even numbered subregions 
are excluded from the product fingerprint.  This process yields a fingerprint comprised of 
features based on      subregions.  Figure 3.9 shows a ZigBee amplitude response 
collected by the X310 SDR with       subregions highlighted.  
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Figure 3.9: Experimentally Collected ZigBee Preamble with       Subregions. 
 
The collected amplitude waveform shown in Figure 3.9 is        samples (130 
µs) in length, which is approximately equal to the standard length of             from 
the IEEE specification.  In the simplified MATLAB model, the following time-domain 
responses were chosen for fingerprint generation: 
1. Real-valued (Re[n]) time domain waveform, 
2. Imaginary-valued (Im[n]) time domain waveform, 
3. Instantaneous phase ([n]) given by 
 
            
     
     
   (3.2) 
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4. Instantaneous amplitude (a[n]) given by 
                        . (3.3) 
For each of      subregions of the      ,      ,      and      waveforms,  
the variance (σ
2
) of each respective waveform was calculated and concatenated to form 
fingerprint vector      as follows: 
           
       
      
       
      
       
      
       
  . (3.4) 
Fingerprint vector      was then rounded to 32-bit fixed-point decimal to match 
the 32-bit output capability of the X310 SDR.  A total of         bursts were 
transmitted by each of      devices and received by the X310 SDR at a sample rate of 
        .  A fingerprint vector      was generated for each burst received, and an 
MDA/ML classification model was built and evaluated as described in Chapter 2.  
3.3 FPGA Fingerprint Generation 
The X310 SDR has a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA which contained the DDC chain as 
described in Section 3.1.  A fingerprint generator was designed for the Kintex-7 with the 
purpose of implementation on the X310 SDR FPGA.  The fingerprint generator design 
was then simulated with ModelSim FPGA simulation software to generate the FPGA-
Simulation fingerprint vector     .  Generation of FPGA-hardware fingerprint vector      
was then accomplished by synthesizing the fingerprint generator design within the X310 
SDR FPGA. 
3.3.1 FPGA Fingerprint Generator Design 
The block diagram for the developed FPGA fingerprint generator design is shown 
in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10: Fingerprint Generator Design as Implemented on X310 SDR FPGA.  
 
The design was developed to match MATLAB model functionality as described 
in Section 3.2.  A CORDIC module was implemented in vectoring mode as described in 
Chapter 2.  The CORDIC module was used to calculate the instantaneous phase      and 
instantaneous amplitude      from       and      .  The functional component groups 
of the FPGA fingerprinting design are: 
 
1. A squaring-smoothing amplitude-based burst detector as described in Section 
3.2.1. 
2. A CORDIC module operating in vectoring mode as described in Chapter 2. 
3. Variance calculating modules for each of      instantaneous feature 
waveforms.  Variance calculators were implemented in parallel.  Because of 
parallel implementation, all      variance values for a given subregion are 
calculated simultaneously. 
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After calculation of      variance values for the given subregion, results were  
sent out of the X310 SDR for concatenation into the full-dimensional fingerprint vector. 
3.3.2 Simulated FPGA Fingerprint Generation 
To characterize any coloration effects inherent to the FPGA-implemented 
fingerprint generator design, a simulation model was desired.  The fingerprint design as 
described in Section 3.3.1 was implemented in a ModelSim FPGA simulation 
environment.  Experimentally collected ZigBee bursts were used as input to the 
ModelSim simulated design, and the simulation-generated fingerprints      were collected 
and stored for classification performance analysis.  This simulation setup is shown in 
Figure 3.11. 
To build a classification model as described in Chapter 2, a total of         
bursts were simulated as collected from each of     .  Simulation-generated 
fingerprints      were collected and used for model development results as presented in 
Chapter 4.  
3.3.3 Hardware FPGA Fingerprint Generation 
To characterize the real-time performance of the FPGA-based fingerprint 
generator, the fingerprint generator module was inserted at the end of the X310 SDR 
DDC chain and instantiated in the actual FPGA hardware.  The block diagram for the 
resultant X310 SDR hardware chain is shown in Figure 3.12. 
As shown in Figure 3.12, the FPGA-based hardware implementation allows for 
hardware-generated fingerprints      to be streamed to the computer as they are received 
by the X310 SDR.  A total of         bursts were collected and processed from each  
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Figure 3.11: ModelSim FPGA Simulation Environment for Generation of      from X310 
SDR Collected ZigBee Bursts. 
 
 
of      to generate FPGA-Hardware fingerprints     .  The resultant fingerprints were 
used to build a model and evaluate classification performance as presented in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Feature Set Dimensional Reduction 
The complete RF-DNA fingerprint used in this research is based on      
subregions with      instantaneous feature waveforms.  The length    of a full-
dimensional fingerprint is:  
          (3.5) 
Therefore, a full-dimensional fingerprint of length       was used in this 
research.  A process known as Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) was performed to 
limit the number of features used for model development.  The purpose of DRA is to 
determine which features can be eliminated while maintaining the desired classification  
 
33 
 
Figure 3.12: X310 SDR Hardware Chain with FPGA-based Fingerprint Generator [6]. 
 
 
performance level.  This research compared two methods of DRA: qualitative and 
quantitative.  
Qualitative DRA was performed by selecting all features from a particular feature 
subset: a-only, ϕ-only, Re-only or Im-only.  Each dimensionally reduced feature subset 
was used to form      length fingerprints based only on that subset. 
Quantivative DRA was performed by selecting only the top-5 most relevant 
features as determined by the GRLVQI process.  All DRA feature subsets are displayed 
in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Dimensionally Reduced Feature Sets used for MDA/ML Classification 
DRA Method Feature Set    
Full Dimensional All 20 
Qualitative a-only 5 
Qualitative ϕ-only 5 
Qualitative Re-only 5 
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Qualitative Im-only 5 
Quantative GRLVQI Top-5 5 
 
3.5 Device Classification 
After            and       fingerprints were generated from         bursts each, 
and for each of      devices, they were input to the MDA/ML or GRLVQI device 
discrimination process.  MDA/ML and GRLVQI were performed as described in Chapter 
2.  The fingerprints were first separated into equal length training and testing fingerprint 
sets.  Training and testing fingerprint sets were taken as interleaved (odd and even) 
subsets of the complete fingerprint set.  The training set was then input to the MDA/ML 
and GRLVQI classifiers where the classification models were developed.  A  -fold 
cross-validation process was used by both classifiers to determine the “best” model using 
a     value.  Once models were developed by both classifiers, the testing set of 
fingerprints was used to assess classification performance.  Fingerprints were then 
classified in a “Looks most like?” assessment, assigning each testing fingerprint to the 
device it was estimated to be.  The above steps were repeated for dimensionally reduced 
fingerprint vectors.  These results are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.6 Device ID Verification 
While device classification performed a “Looks most like?” comparison, device 
ID verification provides a “Looks how much like?” assessment.  In the target air monitor 
application, verification will be used to reject “rogue” devices that are not authorized 
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network access.  This rogue rejection will enhance network security and augment 
traditional bit-level security techniques.  
Device ID verification was implemented as described in Chapter 2.  After model 
development, each testing fingerprint was compared to each of      devices on which 
the model was based.  The verification test statistics    provides a measure of similarity 
between the compared pair of devices.  The test statistic    is then compared to a 
verification threshold value    to make a binary decision of accepting or rejecting the 
device’s claimed identity.  By comparing only authorized devices to one another and 
varying the threshold value   , the relationship between True Verification Rate (TVR) 
and False Verification Rate (FVR) was explored.  TVR is the percentage of instances 
where a device is correctly authorized after claiming its own identity.  FVR is the 
percentage of instances where a device is authorized after claiming an identity that is not 
its own.  
An additional case was explored where “rogue” devices were introduced to the 
system claiming the identity of authorized devices.  The relationship between TVR and 
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR) was determined.  RAR is the percentage of instances where a 
rogue device is incorrectly accepted as an authorized device.  Results for TVR vs. FVR 
and TVR vs. RAR are presented in Chapter 4.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides results for Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-
DNA) discrimination of ZigBee devices, to include comparison of fingerprinting 
performance using MATLAB-generated fingerprints, Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA)-generated fingerprints, and fingerprints generated in a simulated FPGA 
environment.  Additional results are analyzed, including authorized and rogue device 
verification using a Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) 
mode.  Classification performance is also analyzed using reduced dimensional feature 
sets (proper subsets of full dimensional feature sets) as well as FPGA timing and 
utilization results.  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents Time-Frequency (T-F) 
analysis of experimentally collected ZigBee signals that were collected using the X310 
Software-Defined Radio (SDR).  Section 4.3 presents classification results of the 
MDA/ML model comparing three fingerprint generation methods: 1) simulated-based 
MATLAB generated fingerprints (    ), 2) simulation-based FPGA generated fingerprints 
(    ), and 3) hardware-based X310 FPGA-generated fingerprints (    ).  Section 4.4 
presents authorized and rogue device model verification results.  Section 4.5 presents 
classification performance results using both qualitative Dimensional Reduction Analysis 
(DRA) as well as the quantitative DRA based on feature relevance ranking using a 
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) process.  
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Finally, Section 4.6 provides timing results for the FPGA hardware design as well as 
device capacity utilization. 
4.2 Time Frequency (T-F) Analysis 
A Time-Frequency (T-F) analysis was conducted to investigate the spectral and 
temporal characteristics of experimentally collected ZigBee signals that were collected 
using the X310 SDR.  Two types of T-F analysis were performed to validate the 
experimental collection setup, including 1) analysis of the X310 SDR internal 
background noise and 2) analysis of experimentally collected ZigBee emission 
characteristics and comparison with standard specifications. 
4.2.1 X310 Background Noise Analysis 
The X310 SDR receiver was operated inside a shielded test enclosure without any 
other devices present.  These collections were used to characterize internal noise to the 
X310 SDR.  Additionally, this analysis showed the effectiveness of the shielded test 
enclosure in attenuating outside radiation.  The noise environment was sampled at a 
sample rate of          and center frequency of             .  These collection 
parameters remained constant for all collections and analysis conducted the research.  
The resultant normalized Power Spectral Density (PSD) for a one minute X310 
background noise collection is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Normalized X310 SDR Background Noise PSD. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the noise environment has a small peak at   = 2.4861 
GHz.  The results obtained in this research are not affected by the internal noise of the 
receiver because it is present equally for all devices. 
4.2.2 Collected ZigBee Emission Analysis 
Using the collection methodology described in Section 3.3, ZigBee beacon 
requests (bursts) were collected with the X310 SDR.  The time domain response of an 
experimentally collected Zigbee burst is illustrated in Figure 4.2: 
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Figure 4.2: Representative X310 SDR Collected ZigBee Burst Amplitude Response 
Showing Preamble and Payload Regions. 
 
As described in Section 2.1, the ZigBee preamble consists of 8 Offset Quadrature 
Phase Shift Keying (O-QPSK) modulated symbols.  Figure 4.3 shows the preamble 
response of a typical ZigBee burst, divided into eight symbols.  The emissions were 
collected near-baseband to enhance the visibility of the information in the figure. 
 ZigBee device transmissions were initiated by controlling the device with a 
computer running the Zbstumbler script.  The zbstumbler script is an open source 
application from the killerbee suite [7], a popular collection of software tools used to 
manipulate ZigBee devices.  The ZigBee devices were configured to broadcast at a 
transmission rate of          .  The frequency domain response for a          
collection is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.3: ZigBee Preamble Response from Fig. 4.2 Showing 8 O-QPSK Symbols. 
 
Figure 4.4: Frequency Response Over Time of      Baseband ZigBee Bursts. 
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Although the burst rate was configured to be          , the actual rate of burst 
transmission was         .  A total of       bursts were collected at sample rate 
         and down-converted to baseband.  The       bursts were then overlaid 
and averaged.  The normalized Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the resultant waveform 
is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 As described in Section 2.1, the specified bandwidth of a ZigBee channel is 
           .  Therefore, the single-sided baseband bandwidth of a ZigBee channel 
is            .  There is a 7 dB decrease in power at            .  These 
results are illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
4.3 Classification Model Development 
Using the X310 SDR operating in fingerprint generation mode inside a shielded 
test enclosure, a total of         ZigBee bursts were collected per device.  The 
collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio was on the order of              for all of the 
     devices.  A total of         fingerprints were generated by the X310 SDR.  
Using MDA, a classification model was developed based on the fingerprints of Atmel 
RZUSBstick devices 1, 2 and 3.  The model was developed using          training 
fingerprints per device, extracted from a larger pool of         total fingerprints, with 
full-dimensional fingerprints generated on the FPGA.  
A K-fold cross-validation process was used to determine the “best” MDA model 
using a     value.  A model was developed that maximized Euclidian distance 
between device/class means.  That model was used as the projection matrix  .   
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Figure 4.5: Normalized PSD of       Averaged Baseband ZigBee Bursts. 
 
Projection matrix    was then multiplied by each of          testing 
fingerprints per device to project the fingerprint into a 2-dimensional Fisher space.  The 
model accuracy was quantified using average percent correct classification (%C) based 
on testing fingerprint classification performance for each device, as well as a cross-class 
%C for all devices.  These results are shown in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6: MDA/ML %C for each Class/Device and the Cross-Class/Device Average 
%C at              using          Fingerprints per Class/Device. 
 
In addition to cross-class    as shown in Figure 4.6, the tendency for devices to 
be incorrectly classified as each other was also quantified and reflected in the 
classification confusion matrix as shown in Table 4.1. 
As shown in Table 4.1, all devices achieved an arbitrary benchmark of correct 
classification rate       .  Additionally, while device 3 achieved        , 
devices 1 and 2 “looked like” each other, resulting in some misclassification between the  
two devices.  New models for      and      devices were created to assess the 
performance of the system with additional devices.  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the 
confusion matrices for      and      class problems, respectively.  
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Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix of     Class Problem at             . 
In
p
u
t 
Classified As 
 Dev 1 Dev2 Dev 3 
Dev 1 98.6% 1.4% 0% 
Dev 2 2.2% 97.8% 0% 
Dev 3 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix of      Class Problem at             . 
In
p
u
t 
Classified As 
 Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev3 Dev 4 
Dev 1 98.8% 1.2% 0% 0% 
Dev 2 1.8% 98.2% 0% 0% 
Dev 3 0% 0.2% 99.6% 0.2% 
Dev 4 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix of     Class Problem at             . 
In
p
u
t 
 Classified As 
 Dev 1 Dev 2 Dev 3 Dev 4 Dev 5 
Dev 1 98.6% 1.4% 0% 0% 0% 
Dev 2 1.2% 98.8% 0% 0% 0% 
Dev 3 0% 0% 99.8% 0.2% 0% 
Dev 4 0% 0% 0.2% 99.8% 0% 
Dev 5 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
4.4 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) 
Because of the algorithm used by MDA/ML in generating a classification model, 
the specific features which give the best classification performance cannot be determined.  
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) techniques can be used to identify a selected 
subset of features that provides acceptable classification performance.  Dimensional 
reduction can be achieved using qualitative methods or quantitative methods.  Examples 
of qualitatively selected feature subsets include amplitude-only (Amp), phase-only (Phz), 
Real-only (Re) and Imaginary-only (Im).  A GRLVQI classifier, described in Section 2.4, 
was also used to quantitatively select a subset of features based on their respective 
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influence on correct device classification.  Figure 4.7 shows classification performance 
results of an initial trial comparing qualitatively selected features and the top-ranked 
     quantitatively selected features as selected by GRLVQI.  The best performance of 
        is obtained by using the full-dimensional set of    = 20 features.  
Additionally, the FPGA hardware performance was contrasted with the performance of a 
simulated FPGA environment.  These results are also shown in Figure 4.7. 
Additional FPGA hardware trials were performed for a total of         trials.  
The performance results from         trials are shown with 95% confidence intervals 
(CI) in Figure 4.8.  The mean %C for each DRA subset is also shown in Figure 4.8 with 
95% confidence intervals omitted because they are within the vertical extent of the 
markers. 
As shown in Figure 4.8, the full-dimensional       fingerprints consistently 
exceeded the arbitrary benchmark of %C = 90% for all         trials.  Cross-trial 
mean results for    = 5 Amp, Re, and Im are statistically equivalent based on 95% CI.  
Finally, performance was poorest for the    = 5 Phz DRA fingerprints which consistently 
yielded the lowest %C classification performance. 
4.5 Device Verification and Rogue Detection 
Device verification allows for a comparison between devices to describe “how 
much alike” the devices are.  By making this comparison, a relationship can be found 
between the True Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate (FVR). TVR is the 
rate at which a device, claiming to be itself, is correctly authorized.  FVR is the rate at 
which an unauthorized device, claiming to be the authorized device, is incorrectly  
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Qualitative (Phz, Amp, Re, Im) and Quantitative (LVQ) DRA 
Performance with Full Dimensional Performance using     ,     , and      Generated 
Fingerprints.  The Number of Features per Feature Set is Indicated in Parenthesis. 
 
Figure 4.8: Average Percent Correct Classification (%C) with 95% Confidence Intervals 
for a Total of         Independent Experimental FPGA Hardware Trials.  The Cross-
Trial Mean Shows that Only the Full-Dimensional       Feature Set Achieves the 
Arbitrary       Benchmark. 
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authorized.  By adjusting the threshold at which a device is successfully authorized, the 
TVR can be increased; however this could also increase the FVR.  
An      class model was developed using the MDA/ML classifier for 
fingerprints generated with FPGA hardware.  This model used a full-dimensional feature 
set of      .  The model was trained using           fingerprints per device.  An 
additional          fingerprints per device were used to compare how much device 1 
looks like device 1, device 2 looks like device 2, etc.  These results are illustrated in 
Figure 4.9.  The dashed line in Figure 4.9 represents an arbitrary benchmark of TVR>0.9.   
The benchmark of TVR = 0.9 resulted in the corresponding FVR = 0.02 for 
devices     and    .  Classification performance for device     is perfect 
throughout this trial. 
Using the same      class model and full-dimensional       feature set, 
devices     and      were introduced as rogue devices.  These      additional 
devices were individually compared with every authorized device.  The Rogue Accept 
Rate (RAR) is the rate at which rogue devices, posing as authorized devices, are 
incorrectly accepted as the claimed identity.  The relationship between TVR and RAR is 
shown in Figure 4.10.  The dashed black line in Figure 4.10 represents an arbitrary 
benchmark of        .  At this benchmark, nearly all cases achieve perfect 
classification performance of         and        .  Only the “4 looks like 3” case 
has imperfect performance of          at          
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Figure 4.9: Full-Dimensional (     ) Authorized Device Verification Results for 
MDA/ML Model and Signals at             . 
 
Figure 4.10: Full-Dimensional (     ) Rogue Device Rejection Results for MDA/ML 
Model and Signals at             . 
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The performance of qualitative DRA for Amp-only, Re-only and Im-only was 
statistically equivalent based on 95% CI.  The performance of Phz-only was significantly 
lower than the other qualitative DRA feature subsets based on 95% CI.  Therefore, Amp-
only was used to generate a computationally light model for device ID verification. 
  The same verification process described previously was repeated for a reduced-
dimension      feature set containing Amp-only fingerprints.  An arbitrary benchmark 
of         and         is used for Authorized Device assessment in Figure 4.11a. 
Similarly, an arbitrary benchmark of         and         is used for Rogue 
Rejection assessment in Figure 4.11b.  With this reduced-dimension      feature set, 
performance was significantly reduced.  The FPGA implementation of the full-
dimensional       fingerprint generator consumed only 17% of the total X310 FPGA 
resources.  Implementing a less computationally complex model is not justified due to the 
poor performance results.   
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.11: Authorized device and rogue rejection for Amp-Only DRA feature set for 
MDA/ML Model and Signals at             . 
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4.6 FPGA Performance 
FPGA simulation software was used with the fingerprint generation design to 
determine the latency in generating fingerprints from a received ZigBee transmission.  A 
ZigBee beacon request collected with the X310 in radio mode was input to the FPGA 
simulation of the fingerprint generation design so that the exact timing characteristics 
could be examined.  Because the FPGA operates synchronously on a fixed clock, 
simulated timing performance will exactly match FPGA hardware timing performance.  
Figure 4.12 displays the fingerprint generation latency of the X310 FPGA design.  Figure 
4.12 shows the real-valued waveform of the ZigBee beacon request with the ROI (Region 
of Interest) and Payload highlighted.  The vertical red line in Figure 4.12 indicates the 
point at which fingerprint generation is complete.  As illustrated in Figure 4.12, 
fingerprint generation completes before most of the Zigbee payload has been received.  
As shown in Figure 4.12, the latency time taken by the FPGA to generate a 
complete fingerprint of a single ZigBee beacon request is short in relation to the length of 
the payload.  Because of the short latency in fingerprint generation time, in future work 
the payload could be selectively accepted or rejected based on fingerprinting results in 
real time, with no loss in Zigbee receiver data throughput.  Figure 4.13 displays this 
fingerprint generation latency in greater detail. 
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ROI Payload
Fingerprint Generation Complete
 
Figure 4.12: Processing Latency of X310 FPGA Real-Time Fingerprint Generation.  
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Figure 4.13: X310 FPGA Fingerprint Generation Processing Latency of       after 
Reception of ROI. 
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As shown in Figure 4.13, the complete       fingerprint is successfully 
generated at       after the ROI is received.  The        latency of generating the 
fingerprint is minimal when compared with the         duration of the payload.  
Assuming a similarly short latency for device classification on FPGA hardware, the 
envisioned air monitor could be configured to selectively reject ZigBee transmissions 
from unauthorized devices in real-time.     
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V. Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Research Summary 
ZigBee networks are currently in place for functions such as monitoring medical 
devices, relaying electrical usage information to utility companies, and maintaining home 
automation systems.  Due to the sensitive nature of many ZigBee applications, 
maintaining a high level of security is essential.  Traditional security techniques for 
ZigBee networks are predominantly based on presenting and verifying device bit-level 
credentials (keys).  While effective to some degree, bit-level-only security is becoming 
increasingly insufficient and ZigBee networks are vulnerable to attack by any 
unauthorized rogue device that can obtain and present bit-level credentials for an 
authorized device.  Even without prior knowledge of the correct key, replay attacks can 
still be employed in which a packet transmitted by an authorized device is collected and 
later replayed by an unauthorized device [18].  
 Previous related research in [5,20,23] has shown that an additional Physical layer 
(PHY) of security can be applied using Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-
DNA) fingerprinting to augment ZigBee bit-level security.  RF-DNA exploitation 
involves generating a uniquely-identifiable “fingerprint” from PHY waveform features 
extracted from emissions of a particular device.  The RF-DNA fingerprint is then used to 
discriminate devices from one another, even when identical (valid or false) bit-level 
credentials are presented.  While previous AFIT research has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of MATLAB simulation-based RF-DNA classification of ZigBee devices, 
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this research provides the next step towards achieving real-time device classification and 
verification.  A complete RF-DNA based security solution for ZigBee devices in the form 
of an air monitor is proposed in [23].  The air monitor would be physically co-located 
with ZigBee devices and actively accept or reject signals from other ZigBee devices 
based on their fingerprint signatures.  The purpose of this research was to demonstrate 
feasibility of the air monitor concept using an Ettus Research X310 Software-Defined 
Radio (SDR) hosting a Kintex-7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). 
5.2 Findings and Contributions 
 An X310 hardware-based design was developed and evaluated in support of 
taking the next step towards achieving reliable air monitoring capability.  The design and 
demonstration was based on a reduced-complexity MATLAB model of the traditional 
RF-DNA fingerprinting process.   
 The reduced-complexity MATLAB model included extraction of RF-DNA 
fingerprint features from ZigBee preamble responses.  The preamble was divided into 
subregions, over which variance-only statistical features were calculated for the 
instantaneous Real (     ), Imaginary (     ), Phase (    ) and Amplitude (    ) 
time-domain responses.  A full-dimensional fingerprint therefore contained a total of 
      features.  MATLAB-generated fingerprints (    ) were created for each of 
     AVR RZUSBstick ZigBee devices and Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification performed.  The average cross-
class accuracy (  ) for the initial trial using full-dimensional      fingerprints exceeded 
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an arbitrary benchmark of        at a collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio (    ) 
            .  
 An FPGA-compatible fingerprinting design was developed based on the 
MATLAB mode.  The FPGA model was simulated using ModelSim simulation software.  
Experimentally collected ZigBee waveforms were collected using the X310 SDR which 
produced baseband sequence signals (        ) that were inputs to the FPGA simulation 
to recreate actual operation.  The FPGA Simulated (    ) fingerprints were created and 
classified using the same MDA/ML classifier.  In this case, the arbitrary        
benchmark was exceeded for an initial trial with             .   
 The simulated FPGA design was integrated into the X310 FPGA hardware by 
instantiating the fingerprint generator following the Digital Down-Conversion (DDC) on 
the X310 Kintex-7 FPGA.  The FPGA-Hardware (    ) fingerprints were generated in 
real-time and streamed to the X310 interface computer.  MDA/ML classification 
performance was assessed for a total of         independent experimental trials, the 
results of which consistently exceeded the arbitrary       benchmark. 
 Following full-dimensional (     ) assessments, Dimensional Reduction 
Analysis (DRA) was employed and classification performance evaluated using 
dimensionally reduced       feature sets.  Using DRA, it was determined that 
fingerprints containing only on      ,      , or      features produced statistically 
similar performance of       , where statistical equivalence is based on 95% 
Confidence Intervals (CI) across         independent experimental trials.  Fingerprints 
containing only           features produced statistically poorer classification 
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performance of       across the         independent experimental trials.  While 
the full-dimensional       feature set consistently achieved the arbitrary        
benchmark, none of the      DRA dimensionally reduced feature sets achieved the 
benchmark.  As designed and implemented, the full-dimensional fingerprint generator 
only utilized 7% of the X310 Kintex-7 FPGA resources.  Because of the low amount of 
FPGA resources required to implement the full-dimensional fingerprint generator, and 
the statistically poorer    performance, the dimensionally reduced      fingerprint 
model is not justified in this application. 
 While the MDA/ML classification provided a “looks most like?” best match 
assessment, device ID verification was performed to conduct a “looks how much like?” 
assessment using the      authorized devices claiming to be themselves.  A Euclidian 
distance measure of similarity    was calculated and compared to a verification threshold 
value    to make a binary accept-reject decision based on the device’s claimed identity.  
By varying threshold   , the relationship between True Verification Rate (TVR) and 
False Verification Rate (FVR) was analyzed.  TVR is the percentage of instances where a 
device is correctly granted network access after claiming its own identity.  FVR is the 
percentage of instances where a device is incorrectly granted network access after 
claiming an identity that is not its own.  For the       full-dimensional feature set, an 
arbitrary benchmark of         and         was achieved for all authorized 
devices.    For      DRA feature sets one of the three devices achieved this benchmark 
while all other devices failed.  For final proof-of-concept demonstration, two rogue 
devices were introduced and presented claimed IDs matching each of the authorized 
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device IDs (a total of 6 rogue assessment scenarios).  A comparison of TVR with Rogue 
Accept Rate (RAR) was made where RAR is the percentage of instances where a device 
is incorrectly granted network access after claiming the identity of an authorized device.  
For the full-dimensional case, an arbitrary benchmark of         and         was 
achieved for all 6 rogue scenarios.     
 Implementation of the full-dimensional fingerprint generator required only 7% of 
the Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA resources.  Therefore, even the mid-level Kintex-7 used in the 
X310 has plenty of room for expanding the air monitor’s capability.  The implemented 
design was able to generate a full-dimensional fingerprint in        after the end of the 
ZigBee preamble was detected.  This latency is a small fraction of the          ZigBee 
payload duration.  Because of the relatively short fingerprint generation latency, an 
unauthorized device transmission can easily be rejected by the air monitor in real-time 
with no loss in ZigBee data throughput from authorized devices.  
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research demonstrates that a low-cost SDR platform with an on-board FPGA is  
viable for air monitor implementation.  As used here for initial proof-of-concept, the 
RZUSBstick ZigBee devices were successfully discriminated using RF-DNA fingerprints 
generated on the X310 SDR FPGA.  The results here set the stage for additional 
hardware-oriented research avenues, including: 
1. Increase RF-DNA Functionality on FPGA:  This research is the first step towards 
a complete implementation of the air monitor.  FPGA capabilities can be 
expanded by implementing additional RF-DNA functionality that was not 
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addressed here, including MDA model development and ML classification.  
Device ID verification can also be implemented on the FPGA hardware. 
2. Consider Alternate Test Statistics:  Traditional RF-DNA fingerprint generation 
involves generating a myriad of high-dimensional test statistics on a general-
purpose computer having virtually unlimited time and computing resources.  In 
migrating some of these more promising test statistics to a real-time FPGA 
implementation having fixed hardware resources, it will be necessary to consider 
which test statistics offer the best performance and which can be implemented 
within hardware resource constraints.   
3. Perform a Real-Time Demonstration:  The culmination of AFIT’s wireless RF-
DNA Fingerprinting research will be successful implementation and 
demonstration of an air monitor.  This includes demonstrating that bit-level 
security can be augmented by PHY RF-DNA fingerprinting to provide enhanced 
security in real-time with enhanced speed, efficiency and robustness. 
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